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TURNING RAT AND DOING TIME FOR
UNCHARGED, DISMISSED, OR ACQUITTED
CRIMES: DO THE FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES PROMOTE RESPECT FOR

THE LAW?
Keri A. Goukt

I. Introduction
The impetus for this article was a lunch I had with an

attorney-friend who primarily represents indigent federal defendants.
En route to the restaurant, my friend bitterly complained about the
institutional injustices suffered by his clients, most of whom have
been arrested on federal drug-related charges.' "In particular," he
decried, "the government makes all of its cases by 'turning rats' 2-by

© Copyright 1993 by the New York Law School Journalof Human Rights.
. Director of Externship Programs, Adjunct Professor of Law, New York Law
School; B.S. 1978, Union College; J.D. 1982, The Washington College of Law at the
American University. I wish to gratefully acknowledge Casey Donovan whose lunchtime conversation initiated this article, and Professors Michael Perlin and Richard
Marsico for their comments and encouragement on earlier drafts. Lastly, I want to
thank Karyn Zeldman, Sharon Gasparo and Jeff Berger for their many hours of creative
and unflagging research assistance.
I Nationally, over 1/3 of the combined state and federal new inmates are drug
offenders. Over 60% of those in federal prisons have been convicted of drug offenses.
Jack B. Weinstein, The War On Drugs Is Self-Defeating, N.Y. TIMEs, July 8, 1993 at
A19. In 1981, drug defendants numbered about 7,500, comprising close to 18% of the
federal criminal caseload. By 1990, federal drug offenders numbered more than 20,000
or about one third of the caseload. Nationally, more than 64% of the federal criminal
caseload increase over the past decade is due to drug cases. Terrence Dunworth &
Charles D. Weisselberg, Felony Cases and the Federal Courts: the Guidelines
Experience, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 99, 124 (1992).
2 "Rats," "snitches," "stoolies," "finks," or persons who "turn" or "twist" are all
terms which refer to informants. Popular imagery of such people is particularly
negative. James W. Marquart & Julian B. Roebuck, Prison Guards and "Snitches", 25
BRITISH J. CRIM. 217, 217 (1985); Evan Haglund, Note, Impeaching the Underworld
Informant, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1405, 1408-9 (1990) (a "twist" or immunized informant
trades information for leniency on his charges).
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shaking down the small-time criminals3 so that they inform on friends
and family. 4 Having practiced in the New York State system, where
"turning" 5 defendants is less common, I inquired about how federal
prosecutors are able to turn rats with such ease and with such a high
rate of success. 6 My friend replied that Assistant United States
Attorneys are able to compel compliance from defendants because the
United States Sentencing Guidelines permit departures from the
applicable guideline sentencing ranges7 or mandatory minimum
3Henry J. Reske, Senior Judge Declines Drug Cases, 79 A.B.A. J., 22, 22 (July
1993). Disproportionately severe sentences for low level drug offenders continue to
sustain widespreadjudicial criticism. Deborah Young, Rethinking the Commission 'sDrug
Guidelines:Courier Cases Where Quantity Overstates Culpability, 3 FED. SENTENCING
REP. 63 (1990). Most recently, Judge John S. Martin (S.D.N.Y.) has written, "sending
street level dealers... to jail for ten years will have no impact on the drug problem in
this country. It does, however, reflect poorly on our system of justice." U.S. v. Genao,
831 F. Supp. 246, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). See Edward Adams, FederalJudge Scores
Mandatory Sentencesfor DealingDrugs, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 26, 1993, at Al. The use of
lengthy imprisonment to dissipate the drug war was found to be inadequate at the state
level as well. Assemblyman Daniel L. Feldman of Brooklyn, a past criminal justice
chairman of the National Conference of State Legislators, believes that the problem with
crime crackdown is that it focuses on the lower levels of the drug culture, packing the
prisons with easy long-term convictions. Francis X. Clines, PrisonsRun Out of Cells,
Money and Choices, N. Y. TIMES, May 28, 1993, at B7.
' The federal government has increasingly used the defendant's former cohorts, other
criminals acting as informants, and even family members coerced into informing on
relatives, as the source of such witness testimony. Steven S. Nemerson, Coercive
Sentencing, 64 MINN. L. REv. 669, 679 (1980).
1 "Turning" occurs when a defendant is turned into a witness for the prosecution, for
which he or she generally receives a more favorable sentence. Selwyn Raab, The Care
And Feeding of a Mafia Turncoat, N.Y.TIMES, Mar. 8, 1992, § 4, at 16.
6 Success is measured here by the number of convictions sustained on the basis of
"rat" testimony. No information is available on the number of cases which result in
convictions based upon "rat" testimony. However, such information is available with
regard to the number of informants used by law enforcement agencies. In one year the
FBI reported using 2,800 informants and in the previous year, paying nearly 1.5 million
dollars to informants, resulting in 2,600 arrests. Haglund, supra note 2, at 1411.
7 To sentence a person convicted of a federal crime which does not carry a statutory
minimum (or maximum), judges must use the essentially mathematical calculation
delineated in the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual. See infra, notes 59-71
and accompanying text. Judges may depart downward from the presumptive range
pursuant to the guidelines for rendering substantial assistance to the government resulting
in a fruitful investigation or conviction upon the motion of the prosecutor. 18 U.S.C.A.
app. 4 § 5K1.1 (West Supp. 1993). See also Wade v. United States, 112 S.Ct. 1840,
1843-44 (1992) (courts may only review prosecutor's refusal to file a motion for
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sentences' only when the prosecutor makes a motion to decrease the

sentence due to the defendant's substantial assistance in the
investigation or prosecution of another person. 9

downward departure based upon defendant's substantial assistance if refusal is based on
an unconstitutional motive). In 1989, six percent of all federal cases involved a
substantial assistance motion for downward departure. Ilene H. Nagel & Steven J.
Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities.: An Empirical Study of Charging and Bargaining
Practices Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 501, 553

(1992).
' There are a significant number of federal offenses which require statutory minimum
periods of incarceration. Approximately 100 separate federal mandatory minimum
provisions are currently codified. Only four of those statutes, relating to firearm and
drug offenses, account for the majority of mandatory minimum sentences. Dunworth
& Weisselberg, supra note 1, at 111. Judges may depart below the set minimum
sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1993), for rendering substantial assistance,
which also requires a government motion.
' See 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 5K1.1 (West Supp. 1993) and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e)
(1988). "The guidelines provide only one way to avoid prison: the accused must
'cooperate' and furnish 'substantial assistance' to the government." John Lewis,
Cooperation Under the Guidelines, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 30, 1993, at 2. However, this is not
the only way to depart from the guideline minimum sentences. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)
(1992) and 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 5K2.0 (West Supp. 1993) allow judges to deviate in
the "atypical case" where "mitigating circumstances exist which have not adequately
been taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the
guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described." The district
court must state the "specific reason" for such a departure. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(c)(2)
(West Supp. 1993). Any such departure may be reviewed by an appellate court. 18
U.S.C. § 3742(0 (1993). An upward departure is subject to appeal from the defendant
and a downward departure is subject to appeal from the prosecutor. Under 18 U.S.C.A.
app. 4 § 5K2.0 (West Supp. 1993), the guidelines allow judges to depart downward
based upon the victim's conduct, 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 5K2.10 (West Supp. 1993);
lesser harm, 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 5K2.11 (West Supp. 1993); coercion and duress, 18
U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 5K2.12 (West Supp. 1993); or diminished capacity, 18 U.S.C.A.
app. 4 § 5K2.13 (West Supp. 1993). For instance, diminished capacity may be cause
for a downward departure where "the defendant committed a non-violent offense while
suffering from significantly reduced mental capacity not resulting from voluntary use of
drugs and other intoxicants." 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 5K2.13 (West Supp. 1993).
In practice, district courts have infrequently departed from guideline ranges and
such departures have frequently been overturned by the appellate courts. Cf. Williams
v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1112, 1120 (1992) (adopting a two-part departure analysis
where the reviewing court must first determine if there was an incorrect application of
the guidelines under 18 U.S.C. 3742(0 (1993) and second, if the resulting sentence is
an unreasonably high or low departure from the relevant guideline range); United States
v. Restrepo, 999 F.2d 640, 644 (2nd Cir. 1993) (alien status may warrant leniency in
an extraordinary case, but impending deportation of defendant is not enough to trigger
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"It is no secret," my friend went on, "that federal sentences
are excessive and overly harsh, particularly in relation to drug
cases,'" which make up the large bulk of a Federal Criminal Justice
When faced with the prospect of
Act" attorney's caseload.
extraordinarily long incarceration, many defendants see no other
option than to do or say whatever it is which will spare them from
greater prison time."12
"As if that wasn't bad enough," he went on, "during the
sentencing phase of the trial, the judges can consider evidence of

downward departure); United States v. Denardi, 892 F.2d 269 (3rd Cir. 1989)
(defendant's cooperation with government, absence of prior criminal record, exemplary
work history, lifetime of love and devotion to family and friends, and extreme hardship
suffered by defendant's family as a result of sentence are not mitigating factors so as to
allow departure from guideline range); United States v. Desormeaux, 952 F.2d 182, 185
(8th Cir. 1991) (district court's downward departure overturned despite defendant's
history of abuse and resulting emotional trauma, positive post-arrest conduct, and
victim's wrongful conduct). The extent to which courts have allowed the use of
individual characteristics to depart under 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 5K2.0 has varied. Karin
Bornstein, 5K2.0 Departuresfor 5H Individual Characteristics:A Backdoor Out of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 24 COL. HuM. RTs. L. REv. 135, 146 (1992-93)
(arguing that the variance reflects different judges' own preferences for different theories
of punishment and that some judges have departed in order to further the goal of
rehabilitation). Overall, in 1990, federal courts cumulatively departed 15.7% of the time
and sentenced within the guidelines 83.4% of the time. These figures do not distinguish
the basis upon which the departure was made. Id. at 160. However, the reasons most
often listed for § 5K2.0 departures are substantial assistance, terms of plea bargain
agreement, acceptance of responsibility, family ties, adequacy of decreased sentence to
meet the purposes of sentencing, physical condition, age, maintaining the defendant's
sentence on par with co-defendants' sentences, and rehabilitation. Id.
10See Young, supra note 3, at 63.
11 18 U.S.C.A. § 3006A (West Supp. 1993) (The CJA panel provides a plan for
furnishing representation for any person financially unable to obtain adequate
representation).
12"The prosecutor now has so much discretion and power in charging and in
recommending departures from the guidelines and even minimum sentences that very few
defendants can withstand pressure to 'cooperate'." Jack B. Weinstein, A Trial Judge's
Reflections on DeparturesFrom the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 5 FED. SENTENCING
REP. 6, 7 (1992). Professor Alan Dershowitz believes that the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations law (RICO) "almost forces cooperation because people who are
threatened with the RICO statute have no choice but to cooperate. . . . Once people
become cooperators, they become cooperators with a vengeance. I've seen my clients
try to make up stories." Mark Curriden, No Honor Among Thieves, A.B.A. J., June
1989, at 52, 56 (1989).
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uncharged crimes, dismissed counts, and even charges for which the
defendant has been acquitted. "1 3 "Think of it," he exclaimed, "even
if your client was acquitted of a crime, or the charges were dismissed
pursuant to plea negotiations, those alleged crimes can still
legitimately impact your client's sentence. "14
13A person may be sentenced to prison on the basis of conduct of which a jury has

acquitted him, or on the basis of charges that did not result in conviction. Daniel J.
Freed, FederalSentencing in Wake of Guidelines: UnacceptableLimits on the Discretion
of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1714 (1992). The argument, of course, is that the
uncharged, dismissed, or acquitted crimes are related conduct which should be taken into
consideration to apply a "just" sentence. William W. Wilkens & John R. Steer, Relevant
Conduct: The Cornerstoneof the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. Rv. 495,
514 (1990). A decision was made by the United States Sentencing Commission
("Commission") to use a hybrid "real offense" sentencing system rather than a
"conviction based" system. 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 1B1.2 (1993). See generally Stephen
Breyer, The FederalSentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They
Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1 (1988) (discussing compromises made in order to use this
system). A "real offense" system allows the judge to consider factual information about
the crime which was not brought out in the trial as well as other allegations against the
offender which have never been "acknowledged by the defendant nor proven in court
beyond a reasonable doubt." Freed, supra at 1712. See also United States v.
Rodriguez-Gonzalez, 899 F.2d 177, 181-82 (2d Cir. 1990) (double jeopardy and due
process are not violated when defendant's sentence is enhanced on basis of conduct
which resulted in an acquittal of those charges), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 844 (1990).
Contrary to the federal system, the Minnesota guidelines reject real offense sentencing
(as did every other sentencing commission convened in the United States) with the
rationale that due process is offended when the government or court allows the use of
unadjudicated crime information to enhance guideline sentences. Freed, supra at 1713
n. 168.
14 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § lB1.3 (West Supp. 1993). The guidelines seek to punish
offenders for "the actual conduct.., engaged [in] regardless of the charges for which
[the defendant] was indicted or convicted." United States v. Galloway, 943 F.2d 897,
900 (8th Cir. 1991). Under 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 1B1.4 (West Supp. 1993), the court
may consider "without limitation, any information concerning background, character and
conduct of the defendant, unless otherwise prohibited by law." See 18 U.S.C. § 3661
(1992) (distinguishing between factors that determine the applicable guideline sentencing
range and information a court may consider in imposing sentence within that range). The
court may take into consideration uncharged, dismissed, or acquitted crimes. United
States v. Wood, 924 F.2d 399 (1st Cir. 1991) (allowing evidence of uncharged drug
transactions, which allegedly took place months before, to be admitted in setting base
offense level). One survey indicated that in half of all cases uncharged conduct increases
the offender's sentence. Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality in Guideline Sentencing, 28 Am.
C.um. L. REv. 161, 209 (1991). Additionally, under 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 6A1.3
(West Supp. 1993), the sentencing judge may consider hearsay evidence of defendant's
criminal history and activities if such evidence bears sufficient indicia of reliability to
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My friend believes that the system is fundamentally unfair,
and is supported and promoted by legislative rules and prosecutorial
procedures which oppose fundamental values established in our
society." He finds it reprehensible that clients are forced to make
impossible decisions between inordinately long periods of
incarceration or "ratting" and placing themselves and their families
16
at risk.
My friend, a seasoned defense attorney, feels so ethically
maligned by the system that he questions whether the federal
sentencing guidelines, or the actions of those empowered under the
guidelines, square with society's ideals of morality and fairness. It
stands to reason that the same consternation is felt by federal
defendants and inmates. 17 This pervasive sense of injustice is
support its probable accuracy. See United States v. Marshall, 519 F. Supp. 751 (D.C.
Wis. 1981), aff'd, 719 F.2d 887 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Fatico, 579 F.2d 707
(2d Cir. 1978). The Commission believes that the preponderance of the evidence
standard is appropriate to resolve factual disputes. 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 6A1.3 (1993);
FEDERAL SENTENCINO GUIDELINES MANUAL 339 (West 1993) (commentary). The Ninth
Circuit defines preponderance of the evidence in sentencing as "a sufficient weight of
evidence to convince a reasonable person of the probable existence of the enhancing
factor." United States v. Restrepo, 903 F.2d 648, 654-5 (9th Cir. 1989); reh 'g granted,
912 F.2d 1568 (1990), withdrawn in part on other grounds, 946 F.2d 654 (1991).
Judges also rely heavily upon the hearsay information contained in the presentence report
when determining the applicable sentence range. Probation officers conduct in-depth
investigations and write the reports. FED. R. CIiM. P. RULE 32(C). See also United
States v. Chaikin, 960 F.2d 171, 174 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (sentencing court may consider
defendant's background and criminal history outside convicted counts and including
charges in indictment dismissed by prosecutors). In addition, judges may consider
evidence excluded from trial based upon Fourth Amendment violations when determining
sentencing range. United States v. Lynch, 934 F.2d 1226 (1lth Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S.Ct. 885 (1992).
,SThere is a long tradition of judicial leniency for informant testimony, but the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines present the first time that the Supreme Court has
sanctioned the codification of such behavior. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
"6Jack B. Weinstein, The Informer: Hero or Villain?-Ethical andLegal Problems,
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 8, 1992, at 1; Lewis, supra note 9, at 2 ("Cooperating is dangerous. Of
the 13,000 people enrolled in the Federal Witness Protection Program, more than one
half are at risk merely because they are related to actual witnesses.").
17There is evidence that the basis of most inmate complaints is the manner in which
they are treated. When inmates perceive that they are dealt with capriciously by the
correctional administration or individual officers, psychological stress is created-even
in the most humane of prisons. James Bonta & Paul Gendreau, Reexamining the Cruel
and Unusual Punishment of Prison Life, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 347, 361 (1990).
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worrisome and emphasizes the need and importance of analyzing the
guidelines through a therapeutic jurisprudence perspective.'" In other
words, essential to a policy-oriented assessment of whether the
guidelines can and do fulfill their legislative goals is an investigation
into the effects the guidelines have on those accused and/or convicted
of federal crimes." This article begins such an inquiry by looking at
particular guidelines provisions in relation to the specific goal of
promoting respect for the law.
This article questions the practices of coercing defendants to
"rat" in return for lesser sentences and using evidence of uncharged,
dismissed or acquitted crimes to boost sentences. Specifically, this
article questions whether these practices significantly contribute to the
federal defendants' and inmates' perceptions of the system as immoral
such that there is a measurable effect on trial behavior, correctional
facility misbehavior, or on recidivism rates. In doing so, this article
hopes to encourage behavioral scientists and members of the legal
community to empirically study the following issues:
- Do federal defendants have the perception that the law does
not support a commitment to "moral" norms?
- If so, which defendants are most likely to hold such beliefs
and how, if at all, does this impact the federal criminal justice
system?
One of the few studies of inmate perception of indeterminate sentencing found a
disturbing theme wherein twenty percent of those interviewed (the majority of whom
were serving time for serious crimes) believed that switching to a system of determinate
sentencing would result in a "likely increase of violence both in and outside of prison."
Calvin J. Larson & Bruce B. Berg, Inmates Perceptions of Determinate and
Indeterminate Sentences, 7 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 127, 132 (1989). For a definition of
"indeterminate" sentencing, see infra note 111.
1sFor a definition and discussion of therapeutic jurisprudence, see infra notes 22-47
and accompanying text.
9 Another aspect of this therapeutic jurisprudence perspective, although beyond the
scope of this article, is the impact a defense attorney's frustration or ambivalence with
adhering to certain criminal procedure provisions has on the system as a whole and on
the individual client. How often, and in what manner are such frustrations communicated
to clients and how do such explicit or implicit communications impact on the attorneyclient relationship and case strategy? See Keri A. Gould, TherapeuticJurisprudenceand
the Arraignment Process: The Defense Attorney's Dilemma-Whether to Request a
Competency Examination, 16 INT. J. L. & PSYCHIATRY (forthcoming 1994) (therapeutic
jurisprudence analysis of the attorney-client relationship during the arraignment process
with regard to requesting a competency examination).
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- Do certain provisions of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
produce antitherapeutic effects on inmates? Should this have an
effect on federal sentencing policy?
A discussion of these issues, examined with a therapeutic
jurisprudence perspective, may enlighten us as to the faulty
functioning of the federal criminal system and uncover issues to be
investigated and resolved by interdisciplinary methodology.2 °
This article proceeds in the following manner: Part II
discusses therapeutic jurisprudence and its application to criminology;
Part III gives a brief history and structural synopsis of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines; Part IV details the sentencing departure
provisions; Part V relates those provisions to the general goals of
sentencing and one specific guideline goal-promoting respect for the
law; Part VI details the demographics of the federal inmate
population and illustrates the way sentencing departure provisions
provoke perjurious testimony at trial, correctional institution
management problems, and perhaps increased recidivism rates; Part
VII concludes by suggesting that if an empirical study can link the
occurrence of those behaviors with inmate reaction to certain
guideline provisions, then the guidelines are not promoting respect for
the law as mandated by the legislature.
II. Therapeutic Jurisprudence
Therapeutic jurisprudence is an interdisciplinary approach to
formulating investigative quests aimed at resolving some of the most
difficult social science issues confronted by modern lawmakers. The
development of this scholarly approach followed a shift within legal
writings toward expanding the boundaries of interdisciplinary
research, thereby promoting policy arguments to resolve social
dilemmas. This shift follows a new concept of law which recognizes
that legislatures and administrators, as much as judges, are primary

2 "Many such questions require analysis by economists, scientists, law enforcement
specialists, sociologists, ethnicists, religious leaders and others." Weinstein, supra note
1, at A19. A multitude of difficult questions are raised in the effort to devise a more
effective drug strategy. See David B. Wexler, TherapeuticJurisprudence and Changing
Conceptions of Legal Scholarship, 11 BEHAVIORAL SCI & L. 17 (1993).
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lawmakers. 2" In today's hands-on legal world, the analysis of a law's
direct impact on a particular social problem or set of social problems
is heralded over less efficient appellate case analysis. 2 A law is
deemed successful if its results satisfactorily tackle the immediate
This new legal scholarship often offers
social dilemma.'
recommendations or reformulated areas of inquiry which instruct
legislatures and other administrative bodies on how to achieve such
law reform.' This approach is particularly relevant when examining
the federal policy on criminal justice sentencing. The federal
sentencing policies were formulated by the legislature which in turn
entrusted the United States Sentencing Commission to achieve its
goals through the promulgation of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. 5
Therapeutic jurisprudence is the study of the role of the law
as a therapeutic agent, exploring the extent to which substantive
rules, legal procedures, and the roles of judges and lawyers produce
therapeutic or antitherapeutic consequences.26
It promotes an
interdisciplinary approach to assessing policy considerations in legal
practice where the prescriptive focus is on the therapeutic value of the

21 Wexler,

supra note 20, at 18.

2 Id. at 19.
2 Id. at 18.
24 Id.

at 19.
' See generally 28 U.S.C. § 991 (1984) (establishing the United States Sentencing
Commission and directing it to establish sentencing policies and practices). The courts
have granted the Commission broad discretion in interpreting the validity of individual
guidelines, Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), policy statements, Williams
v. United States, 112 S.Ct. 1112 (1992), and commentary, Stinson v. United States,
113 S.Ct. 1913 (1993).
' See generally THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC
AGENT (David B. Wexler ed., 1990) [hereinafter LAW AS AGENT]; ESSAYS IN
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1991)

[hereinafter ESSAYS]; Wexler, supra note 20, at 17; David B. Wexler & Bruce J.
Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Criminal Justice Mental Health Issues, 16
MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 225, 225 (1992) [hereinafter Wexler &
Wimick, Criminal Mental Health]; David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic
Jurisprudenceas a New Approach to Mental Health Law PolicyAnalysis and Research,
45 U. MiAaI L. REV. 979, 981 (1991) [hereinafter Wexler & Winick, New Approach];
Michael Perlin & Deborah A. Dorfman, Sanism, Social Science, and the Development
of Mental Disability Law Jurisprudence, 11 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 47 (1993).
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process,27 within the boundaries set by principles of justice.2"
However, such methodology does not suggest that clinical concerns
predominate all others, nor does it presume to trump civil liberties.29

2 Healthcare professionals may define the term therapeutic in its prototypical
manner, such that its use as an analytically descriptive term is disputed:
I am troubled by the use of the term therapeutic and I am concerned
that the good intentions [of those advocating therapeutic
jurisprudence research] may be thwarted. Let me explain why:
(1) The term therapeutic applies to an individual person
usually. In that context it is easier (although it is
still hard) to define what a therapeutic outcome should be. The use
of the term as it applies to more than one person, such as with
regard to the outcome of a criminal case where the impact of the
process on the victim is as important as the impact on the defendant,
becomes much more complicated. Almost all legal decisions are a
balance of complex interests, and I don't know if we can denote that
by using the term therapeutic.
(2) Even when dealing with the individual case, even in
a clinical sense, it can be very difficult to decide
what is therapeutic and what is not, and we [psychiatrists] go
through a trial and error process trying to find that out. Wisely, the
medical community has come to the notion of "above all, do no
harm." This is a much more modest mandate than saying we have to
be therapeutic.
(3) Since we are all informed by our own training and philosophies,
there is a danger that we inadvertently imbue those terms with our
own meaning and I have heard therapeutic equated with civil
liberties. It may be so in some cases that the greatest democracy may
be the most therapeutic, but that is definitely not true in all cases. As
lawyers you may be more prone to subscribe to that bias and then
use the term therapeutic in a way which obviates or makes less clear
where you are coming from.
Dr. Renata Wack, Kirby Forensic Psychiatric Center, Remarks at the Symposium on
Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Restructuring Mental Disability Law, at The New York Law
School (April 23, 1993) [hereinafter Remarks of Wack] (video tape on file with author).
Legal doctrines from the therapeutic jurisprudence perspective sometimes constrain the
manner in which the mental health system can pursue its therapeutic mission, but in
other circumstances legal protection and the therapeutic mission of the mental health
system converge. Robert F. Schopp, Therapeutic Jurisprudenceand Conflicts Among
Values in Mental Health Law, 11 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 31, 31 (1993).
s Wexler, supra note 20, at 17.
Ild.; Wexler & Winick, New Approach, supra note 26, at 982.
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Therapeutic jurisprudence is primarily concerned with legal

issues and proscribes deference to clinical expertise."
Overall, therapeutic jurisprudence assumes a hypothesis-generating
role which typically calls for further multi-disciplinary research.3"
Therapeutic jurisprudence was originally envisioned as an
alternative to traditional constitutional doctrinal analysis of mental
health law. Increasingly, however, there has been significant "spillover" into other substantive fields including tort law,3 2 attorney-client
relationships, 3 3 criminal law,34 criminal procedure law," and juvenile

law. 6

This article seeks to apply the premises of therapeutic

jurisprudence to generate empirical data so as to better understand the

questions raised by the implementation of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines.

Therapeutic jurisprudence can help to demystify the

30 Wexler & Winick, New Approach, supra note 26, at 983. See Remarks of Wack,

supra note 27.
31 Wexler, supra note 20, at 21.
3 DanielW. Shuman, TherapeuticJurisprudence
and Tort Law: A Limited Subjective
Standard of Care, 46 SMU L. REv. 409, 410 (1992); Robert F. Schopp, The
Psychotherapist'sDuty to Protect the Public: The Appropriate Standard and the
Foundationin Legal Theory andEmpiricalPremises, 70 NEB. L. REv. 327, 329 (1991);
Robert F. Schopp & David B. Wexler, Shooting Yourself in the Foot with Due Care:
Psychotherapistsand Crystallized Standardsof Tort Liability, 17 J. PSYCHIATRY & L.
163, 164 (1989); Bruce Feldthusen, Sexual Battery as Therapeutic Jurisprudence, (Feb.
2, 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
" Gould, supra note 19 (applying tenets of therapeuticjurisprudenceto the lawyering
skill of counseling criminal clients during the arraignment process with regard to the
request of a competency examination).
' See David B. Wexler, Inducing Therapeutic Compliance Through the Criminal
Law, 14 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 43, 49-50 (1990); David B. Wexler, Insanity Issues
After Hinckley: Tune for a Change, 35 CONTEMP. PSYCHOL. 1068 (1990).
3S Wexler & Winick, Criminal Mental Health, supra note 26, at 226; Jeffrey A.
Klotz & David B. Wexler, et al., Cognitive Restructuring Through Law: A Therapeutic
JurisprudenceApproach to Sex Offenders and the Plea Process, 15 U. PuGET SOUND
L. REv. 579, 581-83 (1992); David B. Wexler, Health Care Compliance Principlesand
the Insanity Acquitee ConditionalRelease Process, 27 CRIM. L. BULL. 18, 29-34 (1991)
[hereinafter Wexler, Healthcare Compliance].
I Murray Levine, A TherapeuticJurisprudenceAnalysis of MandatedReporting of
ChildMaltreatmentby Psychotherapists,10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTs. 711 (1993) (this
issue).
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application of social science in law."

Thus, this article raises

questions whether the effects of the perceived (or misperceived)
injustices resulting from the downward departure provision for
informants and the practice by which judges may consider uncharged,
dismissed or acquitted crimes in determining presumptive sentence
ranges, influence federal defendants and inmates in an antitherapeutic

manner.
Despite voluminous materials on the public's normative

judgment of appropriate federal sentencing,"5 prosecutorial reaction
to the guidelines,"9 defense attorney opinion on the topic, and the
federal judges' reactions,' empirical evidence on the effects of the

" See Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Facts: Scientific Methodology as
Legal Precedent, 76 CAL. L. REv. 877, 879 (1988) (stating court's reliance upon social
science research should have precedential value only to the extent that it determines
whether the methodology used is a legally acceptable way to prove a claim. The
particular application in a single research effort would not be accorded precedential
force.); John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Judicial Use of Social Science Research, 15
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 571, 571 (1991) (increasingly courts have sought out research
data on their own when the parties have not provided it).
' Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New FederalSentencing
Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CIUMINOLOGY 883, 884 (1990).
s' The U.S. Attorney's Office in the Eastern District of New York has also
acknowledged the excessive harshness of the required sentences for federal drug laws in
certain circumstances. To get around the excessive sentences, charges against accused
drug couriers of "mules" caught at Kennedy Airport are routinely "bumped down" to the
next lowest level, a charge which does not carry a statutory minimum sentence. Daniel
Wise, ProcedureAllows Drug Couriers To Receive Lighter Sentences, N.Y.L.J., June
4, 1993, at 1.
' In April 1993, Senior U.S. District Judge Jack Weinstein, of the Eastern District
of New York, announced in a speech given at Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, that
he was taking his "name out of the wheel for drug cases" because "I simply cannot
sentence another impoverished person whose destruction has no discernable effect on the
drug trade." At this same time, Senior U.S. District Judge Whitman Knapp of the
Southern District of New York announced that he would preside over drug trials, but
would refer the cases to other judges for sentencing. Both judges made these
declarations based upon their belief that the government's emphasis on long
imprisonment without treatment, rehabilitation or prevention was a failure. Henry J.
Reske, Senior Judge Declines Drug Cases, A.B.A. J., July 1993 at 22. Judge J.
Lawrence Irving resigned from the federal bench because he believed that the sentencing
guidelines and the increasing number of mandatory minimum sentences were too harsh
and were "dehumanizing the sentencing process." Criticizing Sentencing Rules, U.S.
Judge Resigns, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1990 at 22.
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guidelines as interpreted by criminal defendants and offenders is very
limited. 4 ' This exemplifies the criminal justice system's condoned
marginalization of criminal defendants. Unfortunately, because the
courts and legislatures ignore or minimize "consumer" views and
opinions on sentencing reform risks, they have "fail[ed] to obtain
invaluable information from those in a position to offer unique and
unanticipated insights."42
The disparate treatment of criminal defendants is also shown
in Michael Perlin's work on sanism,43 in which he describes the
discriminatory, pretextual reasoning used by courts and the legal
system against people with mental disabilities. Perlin persuasively
argues that due to sanism, courts teleologically process social science
information to ensure that the courts' preordained, pretextual result
State court judges have also joined in voicing dissatisfaction with excessive
drug sentences which disproportionately affect low-level drug users. E.g., People v.
Perez, 599 N.Y.S.2d 269, 270-71 (1993) (Carro, J., concurring) (defendant's sentence
for drug offense modified downward in the interests of justice):
In considering this sentencing issue I cannot help but question
whether the hemorrhage of taxpayer funds used to warehouse
thousands of low-level drug users and sellers for long periods of time
in our dangerously overcrowded prisons, at a cost of $35,000 per
year per inmate in addition to the capital expenditure of $180,000
per prison cell, could not be more productively and humanely
directed toward prevention, through education, and treatment of drug
addiction. The increasingly unavoidable conclusion that with the
passage of time is becoming more widely recognized and articulated
by respected representatives of our criminal justice system, is that
the primary method currently utilized to deal with the drug epidemic,
essentially an effort to eliminate the availability of drugs on our
streets, while increasing inordinately the length of prison terms for
low-level drug offenders, has failed.
Id. (citations omitted).
4'One notable exception is Larson & Berg, supra note 17, at 132 (finding that more
inmates in a Massachusetts maximum security prison were opposed to or undecided
about, rather than in favor of, determinate sentencing. It is worth noting that at the time
of the study Massachusetts had an indeterminate sentencing system, but that there was
growing support for a bill seeking to implement a presumptive sentencing system which
had been before the state legislature since 1884).
42 Larson & Berg, supra note 17, at 128.
o Michael L. Perlin, On "Sanism", 46 SMU L. REv. 373, 398-406 (1992)
[hereinafter Perlin, Sanism]; Perlin & Dorfman, Sanism and Social Science, supranote
26, at 52-53; Michael L. Perlin, Competency, Deinstitutionalizationand Homelessness:
A Story of Marginalization,28 Hous. L. REv. 63, 92 (1991).

848

NYLS JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS [Vol. X

occurs." Similarly, I opine that certain provisions of the guidelines,
promulgated by the Commission and upheld by the courts, serve to
marginalize defendants and inmates, ignore differing perceptions of
fairness in the law, dismiss the psychological trauma of "ratting,"
and, in opposition to an express goal of the guidelines, breed
contempt rather than respect for the legal process.
Is this simply "old law" methodology which needs to be
infused with "new law" scholarship? Certainly there have been
traditional constitutional challenges to aspects of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines45 as well as innovative theories advanced.'
But perhaps, as in mental health law, it is time to use an
interdisciplinary approach to promote law reform in this area.47

III. The FederalSentencing Guidelines
Before considering the relationship between defendants or
inmates most offended by the guideline provisions and the
legislature's failure to attain its goal of promoting respect for the law,
it is useful to briefly look at legislative history. The Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984' was passed on October 12, 1984, to promote
Perlin, Sanism, supra note 43, at 400-04.
See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 361 (1989) (finding the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines to be constitutional); David A. Hoffman, The Federal Sentencing
Guidelines and Confrontation Rights, 42 DuKE L. J. 382, 384 (1992) (arguing that there
will be additional constitutional challenges to the guidelines based upon confrontation
issues); Mark V. Tushnet, The Sentencing Commission and ConstitutionalTheory: Bowls
and Plateaus in Separation of Powers Theory, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 581, 581 (1992)
(arguing there is no difference between the functional and formal approach to questions
of separation of powers).
"See, e.g., Susan N. Herman, The Tail That Wagged the Dog: Bijfurcated FactFinding Under the FederalSentencing Guidelines and the Limits of Due Process, 66 S.
CAL. L. REv. 289,293 (1992) (arguing for trial-type procedural protections to determine
offense-related facts to be used at sentencing).
' "In the meantime, real people in the real world face the consequences of the
'mathematization' of the criminal justice process wherein judges, lawyers, the accused
and the system itself are reduced to integers in a pseudo-objective attempt to make sense
out of human frailty which by definition makes none." United States v. Boshell, 728 F.
Supp. 632, 642 (E.D. Wash. 1990).
4' Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984), amended by 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-8
(1988).
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honesty in sentencing and reduce sentence disparity. 49 The most farreaching provision of the 1984 Act provided for the creation of an
independent commission in the judicial branch of the United States,
known as the United States Sentencing Commission.50 In October
1985, President Reagan appointed seven persons to serve as the first
members of the Commission.5" Congress entrusted the Commission
with a mandate to promulgate binding "guidelines,"52 general "policy
statements," 53 and commentary,' to be known collectively as the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. These guidelines are contained in the
United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual ("Manual"), 55 and were
meant to ensure a more just and effective sentencing system.5 6 In
addition to promulgating the guidelines, the Commission also was
charged with developing a way to assess the effectiveness of the
guidelines in meeting the Congressionally defined goals of
sentencing. 51

' Nagel, supra note 38, at 883 (author was the first Commissioner appointed to the
Sentencing Commission); Breyer, supra note 13, at 4.
'028 U.S.C. §991(a) (1993).
5'Nagel, supra note 38, at 884.
12 28 U.S.C. § 944(a)(1) (1988). See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. at 361,
391 (holding that the guidelines bind judges and courts in the exercise of their
uncontested responsibility to pass sentence in criminal cases).
" 28 U.S.C. § 944(a)(2) (1988). See Williams v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1112,
1115 (1992) (holding policy statement to be an authoritative guide to the meaning of the
applicable guideline).
The Sentencing Reform Act does not specifically authorize commentary, but the
Act does refer to it: "the court shall consider only the sentencing guidelines, policy
statements, and official commentary of the Sentencing Commission [when determining
whether to depart from guideline range]." 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(b) (West Supp. 1993).
See Stinson v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1913, 1915 (1993) (commentary which
interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a
federal statute, or is inconsistent with or is a plainly erroneous reading of that guideline).
55FEDERAL SENTENCINo GUIDELINES MANUAL 1 (West 1993).

5 See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1988).
s The purposes of the Commission are to:
(1) establish sentencing policies and practices for the Federal
criminal justice system that(A) assure the meeting of the purposes of sentencing as set forth in
section 3553(a)(2) of title 18, United States Code;
(B) provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of
sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among
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After several years of discussion, investigation and
preliminary drafts, the controversial Federal Sentencing Guidelines
became law in November 1987. The guidelines were greeted with an
extraordinary amount of criticism and a plethora of conflicting court
decisions which resulted in the guidelines' patchwork
implementation. 59 It was not until 1989, when the Supreme Court
ruled in Mistretta v. United States6o that the guidelines were
constitutional, that they were fully implemented in all jurisdictions. 1

The sentencing structure set up under the guidelines uses a
mathematical calculation to arrive at the presumptive sentence.
Under its scheme, the judge first uses a correlation table to match the
statute under which the defendant has been convicted to the specific
guideline which addresses that particular crime.62 The guideline
chosen assigns a value, or base offense level, to the crime on a forty-

defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of
similar criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient flexibility to
permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or
aggravating factors not taken into account in the establishment of
general sentencing practices; and
(C) reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in knowledge of
human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process; and
(2) develop means of measuring the degree to which the sentencing,
penal, and correctional practices are effective in meeting the
purposes of sentencing as set forth in sections 3553(a)(2) of Title 18,
United States Code.
28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1) (1988) (emphasis supplied).
' Dunworth & Weisselberg, supra note 1, at 100-6; See Kenneth R. Feinberg, The
Federal Guidelines and the Underlying Purposes of Sentencing, 3 FED. SENTENCING
REP. 326 (1990) (stating that any meaningful discussion of the purposes to be served by
the sentence are lost in the application of the guidelines).
S' Theresa W. Karle & Thomas Sager, Are the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Meeting Congressional Goals?: An Empirical and Case Law Analysis, 40 EmoRY L. J.
393, 402 (1991); Nagel, supra note 38, at 906; Marvin E. Frankel & Leonard Orland,
A Conversation About Sentencing Commissions and Guidelines, 64 U. CoLO. L. REV.
655, 664 (1993) ("with good reason, the judgments of the Federal Commission have
been quite harsh").
'0 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (holding Congress did not excessively delegate its legislative
power and the creation of the Commission did not violate separation of powers).
6" This is not to say, however, that departure policies are the same in every
jurisdiction. In fact, at least one study has shown that there are significant differences
between districts. Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 7, at 553.
' 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 1B1.2 (West Supp. 1993).
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three point scale. Then the judge adjusts the base level to account for
"special offense characteristics" associated with the charges for which
the defendant has been convicted.63 Included at this stage are
considerations such as whether a dangerous weapon was used in the
commission of the offense.' The subtotal is then adjusted for special
victim circumstances,6 such as the defendant's role in the offense,
whether there has been an obstruction of justice, whether the
defendant was convicted of multiple counts," and whether the
defendant has accepted personal responsibility for the offense.67 The
resultant value equals the "total offense level. "68
Next the judge considers the defendant's criminal history and
arrives at one of six criminal history categories.69 Each category has
a range of two to three criminal history points, which are determined
by the length of the prior sentences.7 ° The judge then plots the
offense level and criminal history value on a sentencing chart made
up of two hundred and fifty-eight sentence boxes on a two
dimensional matrix.7" The intersection of the two axes frames the
permissible sentencing range.72

18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 1BL.l(b) (West Supp. 1993).
See United States v. Heldberg, 907 F.2d 91 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Medred, 905 F.2d 935 (6th Cir. 1990). See also 18 U.S.C.A. app 4 § 1B1.4 (West
Supp. 1993).
's 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 §§ 1BL.1(c), 3A1.1-.3, 3B1.1-.4 and 3C1.1-.2 (West Supp.
1993).
"18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 §§ 1Bl.1(d) and 3D1.1-.5 (West Supp. 1993).
17 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 §§ 1B1.1(e) and 3EL.1 (West Supp. 1993). This section
allows for a two-point decrease in offense level.
"See 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 §§ 1B1.1(A)-LBL.1(l) (West Supp. 1993).
18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 §§ 1B1.1(f) and 4A1.1 (1993).
70 Each prior sentence of more than 13 months is assigned three points.
18
U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 4A1.1(a) (West Supp. 1993).
71 Jonathan D. Lupkin, Note, 5Ki.1 and Substantial Assistance Departure: The
Illusory Carrotof the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1519, 1522
(1991).
71 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 1B1.1(g) (West Supp. 1972). Most state guideline systems
use sentencing grids with 12 or less levels as opposed to the 46 in the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. Donald P. Lay, Rethinking the Guidelines: A Call for Cooperation, 101
YALE L.J. 1755, 1770 (1992). C. Marc Miller, True Grid: Revealing Sentencing Policy,
25 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 587, 612 (1992) (suggesting an alternative simplified sentencing
grid).
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In reality, it is generally the probation officer, within the PreSentence Investigation Report (PSI) who performs the technical
calculations on behalf of the judge.7" At least one judge has voiced
concern because "Probation reports are no longer designed to find out
They merely
good as well as bad things about defendants.
mechanically describe what the guidelines consider relevant so that
the judge often will not be aware that there is a basis for departure. "74
In the vast majority of cases, judges simply accept the facts and
calculations set forth in the PSIs. 7
Within the permissible sentencing range, the judge must
determine an appropriate sentence, consistent with the concerns and
purposes of the Act. These include the nature and circumstances of
the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the need
to achieve the recognized purposes of sentencing, the kinds of
sentences available, pertinent policy statements, the need to avoid
unwarranted disparities among similarly situated defendants, the need
to provide restitution to any victims of the offense, and the
establishment of the sentence in the guidelines. 76 The judge may
consider any relevant information regarding the defendant's
background, character, and conduct.77 In practice, the phrase
"relevant information," as used within the guidelines, has a

73FED. R. CIuM. P. 32(c) Rule 12.8.3 states:

The PSI must contain: (1) the history and characteristics of the
defendant, including prior criminal record and any circumstances
affecting the defendant's behavior that might be helpful in
sentencing; (2) the guideline categories, types of sentences and the
sentencing range that the probation officer believes apply to the
particular case, and an explanation of any factors that might warrant
departure; (3) pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission; (4) the impact of the crime on the victim; (5) the
nature and extent of non prison programs available to the defendant;
and (6) any other information that may be required by the court in
sentencing.
Criminal Procedure Project, 81 GEo. L.J. 1423, 1446-7 (1993).
'1 Weinstein, supra note 12, at 8.
71Dunworth & Weisselberg, supra note 1, at 108 (sentencing courts calculated
different guidelines ranges from probation officers in only 10% of cases).
76 18 U.S.C.§ 3553(a)(1)-(7) (1988).
7'18 U.S.C § 3661 (1988).
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particular, rigid meaning and application.7" Judges generally are not
free to use such information to fashion a sentence outside the
boundaries set by the mathematical sentencing equation.

IV. Sentencing Departures
A. Downward Departuresfor Substantial Government Assistance
The guidelines that allow for judicial departure from the
presumptive guideline ranges fall under two exception provisions.
The first exception addresses "atypical cases" not "adequately
addressed" in the guidelines, but which may warrant departure from
them.79 The Commission promulgated a non-exhaustive series of
policy statements which suggest such atypical factors.80
The second departure exception is provided by Policy
Statement § 5K1.1, termed "Substantial Assistance to Authorities."
The § 5K1.1 departure provision does not derive its authority from
§ 3553(b), as in the case of the 5K2.0 departures, but was
promulgated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(n), in a provision added as
part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986,1 and was expressly
designed to function with the guidelines and the 1984 Act. 82 In the
1986 Act, Congress also enacted mandatory minimum penalties for
certain drug and weapons offenses.8 3 The number of congressionally

" 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 1B1.3 (West Supp. 1993).
18 U.S.C. §3553(b) (1988).
'o 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 §§ 5k2.0-.16 (West Supp. 1993).
Anti-Drug AbuseAct of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1008, 100 Stat. 3207, 320708. See Jonathan D. Lupkin, Note, 5K1.1 and SubstantialAssistance Departure:The
Illusory Carrotof the FederalSentencingGuidelines, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1519, 1523-24
(1991); William W. Wilkins, Jr., Plea Negotiations, Acceptance of Responsibility, Role
of the Offender, and Departures:Policy Decisions in the Promulgationof the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 181, 196-202 (1988).
2 Pub. L. No. 99-570 at § 1009.
Drug Possession Penalty Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570 §§ 1051-52, 100 Stat.
3207-8 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 951 (1986)); Ballistic Knife Prohibition Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-570 §§ 10001-04, 100 Stat. 3207-166 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1241,
1245 (1986)).
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mandated offenses with mandatory minimum sentences has increased
steadily since that time."
The Sentencing Commission issued Policy Statement § 5K1.1,
effective on November 1, 1987. At that time, § 5K1.1 provided:
"Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has made
a goodfaith effort to provide substantial assistance in the investigation
or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense, the
court may depart from the guidelines. "85 However, amendments
effective two years later, replaced "made a good faith effort to
provide" with "provided."86
The Commission explained the
amendment as a clarification of its intent that "departures under this
policy statement [must] be based upon the provision of substantial
assistance," not merely a willingness to provide such assistance. 87
This amendment gave federal prosecutors even greater power to
"squeeze" defendants than they previously. Now, even those who
may want to "rat" may not be able to meet the high burden of
providing information which results in the conviction of another.
This allows prosecutors to demand even more dangerous levels of
defendant criminal involvement such as wearing a "wire" or
infiltrating protected conversations88 in order to qualify for the
government motion for a departure below the guideline sentence or
the minimum mandatory sentences.89

Karle & Sager, supra note 59, at 418.
8 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 5K1.1 (West Supp. 1989) (emphasis supplied).
United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, app. C 133 at 290
(West 1990).
" Bradford C. Manq, Rewarding Defendant Cooperation Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: Judge vs. Prosecutors, 1990 CRIM. L. BULL. 399, 406 (1990).
" Q Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 7, at 556 (AUSAs manipulate 5K1.1
departures for sympathetic informants).
" 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (1988) (necessitating a motion by the prosecutor).
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B. Sentencing on the Basis of Uncharged, Dismissed or
Acquitted Crimes
During its deliberations, the Commission debated the merits
of a system where guideline range is determined entirely from the
offenses resulting in conviction or from all alleged offense behavior.9"
The Commission ultimately settled on a somewhat hybrid system.
The guidelines use the conviction offense to determine the base-level
offense9 and then, in the process of adjusting the base level offense,
allow the court to consider all alleged criminal conduct of the
defendant.'
Such information need only be established by a
preponderance of the evidence. 9"However, there have been several
courts which, under certain circumstances, have required a
heightened standard.'

o Wilkens & Steer, supra note 13, at 497; Breyer, supra note 13, at 8-9. See
United States v. Lghodaro, 967 F.2d 1028, 1030 (5th Cir. 1992) (PSIs form factual basis
for judge's sentencing determinations); United States v. Boatner, 966 F.2d 1575, 1578
(Ilth Cir. 1992) (PSI forms factual and legal basis for judge's sentencing determination);
United States v. Helmsley, 941 F.2d 71, 98 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1162 (1992) (PSIs provide objective and factual information); United States v. Terry,
916 F.2d 157, 160 (4th Cir. 1990) (PSI forms factual basis for judge's sentencing
determinations); United States v Jackson, 886 F.2d 838, 842 (7th Cir. 1989) (court may
rely upon information contained in the presentence report).
91 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 1B1.2(a) (1993) (An exception to this provision states that
"in the case of a plea agreement containing a stipulation that specifically establishes a
more serious offense that the offense of conviction, determine the offense guideline
section in Chapter Two most applicable to the stipulated offense.").
' The parameters of the base level adjustments may be found in 18 U.S.C.A. app.
4 § 1B1.3 (West Supp. 1993).
9 United States v. Ross, 905 F.2d 1050, 1054 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 863 (1990); United States v. Avila, 905 F.2d 295, 297 (9th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Byrd, 898 F.2d 450, 452 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Frederick, 897 F.2d
490, 491-92 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 863 (1990); United States v.
Alston, 895 F.2d 1362, 1373 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Gooden, 892 F.2d 725,
728 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 U.S. 908 (1990); United States v. Silverman, 889
F.2d 1531, 1535 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. Guerra, 888 F.2d 247, 251 (2d Cir.
1989); United States v. Williams, 880 F.2d 804, 806 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Urrego-Linares, 879 F.2d 1234, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 943
(1989); United States v. Wright, 873 F.2d 437, 441 (1st Cir. 1989),
9 See Conference on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Summary of Proceedings,
101 YALE L.J. 2053, 2055 (1992) [hereinafter Yale Summary] "When the sentencing
hearing is the tail that wags the dog of the substantive offense, perhaps due process
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Not only can the judge use hearsay information contained in
the pre-sentence report to increase the sentence, but, he or she can
also use conduct for which the defendant was acquitted at trial to
adjust the sentence upwards.9" Pursuant to the "relevant conduct"
provision," the judge must consider all conduct involved with the
charged offense. 97 Relevant conduct may include acts which were
neither charged as a separate offense, nor elements of the offense of
conviction. 98 For instance, if the defendant was charged with
possession of a firearm and possession of a certain amount of drugs,
but was only convicted of possession of a lesser amount of drugs, the
judge, despite a jury acquittal on the other two counts, could find by

a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant had a gun and the
larger weight of contraband, and sentence him or her accordingly.
Unfortunately, this anomaly has lead to abuses of the system
by government agents. For instance, drug enforcement agents who
are knowledgeable about the guidelines, may negotiate with the
defendants to buy a larger amount of drugs than originally bargained

requires more than a minimum indicium of reliability, and a higher standard of proof,
such as clear and convincing evidence, should be applied." Id. at 2055. "In every area
of the law, the greater the sanction that might be imposed, the greater the burden of
proof we require. This sliding scale should apply to sentencing. If a given fact is going
to ratchet a sentence up many levels, the required burden of proof should be greater than
the standard of proof for a fact with little effect on a sentence." Id. at 2065. See also
United States v. Townley, 929 F.2d 365 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that due process may
require facts supporting an 18-level increase based upon uncharged relevant conduct to
be established by clear and convincing evidence); United States v. Restrepo, 946 F.2d
661, 661 (9th Cir. 1991) (Tang, J., concurring) ("mhe severity of penal consequences
associated with a sentencing factor may in some cases tip the balance toward requiring
heightened procedural protection in determining the applicability of that factor."); Joseph
P. Sargent, Comment, The Standardof ProofUnder the FederalSentencing Guidelines:
Raising the Standardto Beyond a Reasonable Doubt, 28 WAKE FOREsT L. REv. 463,
466 (1993) (increasing standard of proof needed when sentencing judge sought to impose
an upward departure from 30 months to 30 years based upon uncharged relevant conduct
offered at sentencing).
9 See Sargent, supra note 94, at 476; Yale Summary, supra note 94, at 2073 ("The
Guideline's approach to measuring relevant conduct is seriously flawed. It measures all
relevant conduct against the same scale, whether or not the defendant has been tried and
convicted for the conduct. This is bad penology and bad morality.").
' See Wilkens & Steer, supra note 13, at 497; Sargent, supra note 94, at 469.
9718 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 1B1.3(a)(1) (West Supp. 1993).
1 Id.
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for, so as to expose the defendant to an increased sentence" or they
may arrange for the deal to go down in a location, such as near a
school, which will lead to increased sentences under mandatory
minimum laws."0 Unscrupulous prosecutors can then rely on judges
to use this information to increase sentences even if they are unable
to build a strong enough case to prove the defendant's guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt on the most severe charges at trial. Reliance upon
unproven allegations increases the leverage available to prosecutors
in plea-bargaining and specifically in inducing recalcitrant defendants
to "rat."
Thus far, these practices have stood up to constitutional
challenge."0° Prior to the imposition of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, judges had great latitude in sentence determinations."
The Court was loathe to inhibit a judge's assessment of an offender's
rehabilitation potential by precluding the judge from using so-called
"related information" which was subject to the evidentiary procedures
required at trial."0 3 This has remained the rule despite the fact that
under the guidelines, the judge's discretion in fashioning an
appropriate sentence has been severely curtailed.
V. The Goals of Sentencing
It is generally accepted that there are four purposes of
sentencing: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation,
and
rehabilitation."' Throughout history, one or the other of these
purposes has dominated sentencing theory and practice."
At the
heart of each new sentencing philosophy is a series of goals which
embrace the current favored purpose. At different times, the

See Yale Summary, supra note 94, at 2059. See also Kinder v. United States, 946
F.2d 362, 365 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 2290 (1992) (on the question of
burden of proof to at sentencing).
'o Yale Summary, supra note 94, at 2074.
101 Kinder, 946 F.2d at 362.
o See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
3 Id. at 247.
o Nagel, supra note 38, at 887.
o See generally id. (reviewing sentencing theory from Moses to the present).
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legislature," the sentencing judge, °7 or various other administrative
groupso ' have been entrusted with the primary responsibility of
fulfilling sentencing goals.
The Sentencing Commission began its work at a time when
enthusiasm for rehabilitation theory was waning." ° Several studies
indicated that criminal rehabilitation was a dead-end goal. 1 ° Public
outcry about increased violence and crime placed the pressure on lawmakers to move away from indeterminate sentencing,' which was
believed to produce disparate sentences, and move toward a "just

06 Congress has met this responsibility by creating the Federal Sentencing

Commission and by passing legislation which delineates mandatory minimum sentences
for certain crimes.
" Federal district judges were the prime arbiters of divining sentences under the
indeterminate sentencing system in effect prior to the implementation of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines. Sentences, as long as they were within the broad ranges set
down by statute, were essentially unreviewable by the appellate courts. United States
v. Schneider, 502 F.2d 897, 898 (8th Cir. 1974); see United States v. DeBright, 710
F.2d 1404, 1405 (9th Cir. 1982) (limited appellate review to determine if district court
properly exercised discretion); United States v. Barbara, 683 F.2d 164, 166 (6th Cir.
1982).
11 Under the present indeterminate sentencing system, the Commission, and perhaps
the United States Attorneys, fulfill this role. Under an indeterminate sentencing system,
the parole boards function in this way by determining when an inmate is ready to be
released from the correctional institution.
"I0Karle & Sager, supra note 59, at 394; Karen Bornstein, 5K2.0Departuresfor5H
Individual Characteristics: A Backdoor Out of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 24
COLuM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 135, 138-39 (1992-3); Nagel, supra note 38, at 884, 8957.

"° DoUGLAS

S.

LITON Elr

AL.,

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL

TREATMENT: A SURVEY OF TREATMENT EVALUATION STUDIES (1975) (promoting the

"Nothing Works" theory). Later, Martinson renounced his views of probation as a
rehabilitative method, Robert Martinson & Judith Wilks, Save Parole Supervision, 41
FEDERAL PROBATION 23, 23 n.3 (1977), and two years later he found "startling
examples" of rehabilitative treatment programs, Robert Martinson, New Findings, New
Views: A Note Of CautionRegarding Sentencing Reform, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 242,255
(1979).
..In indeterminate sentencing, an offender is sentenced to a "flexible sentence"; that
is, the length of actual incarceration is handed down by the sentencing judge in terms
of a minimum-maximum range. The actual amount of time served is determined by both
conditional "good time" early releases (approved by the correctional facility
administration) and periodic evaluations of the prisoner's overall rehabilitation (as
determined by the parole board). Marc Miller, Purposesat Sentencing, 66 S. CAL. L.
REV. 413, 435 n. 94 (1992).
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desserts" sentencing rationale. 12 The "just deserts" sentencing theory
imputes a ranking of criminal behaviors by severity and applies a
similarly ranked order of punishments. 13 Thus, in theory, the just
desserts system of sentencing advocates a system which punishes
individuals who violate the rights of others in accordance with their
individual level of blameworthiness 1 4 and satisfies the public hunger
for the expression of communal blame upon the culpable. 1 In this
way, the criminal conduct is punished without regard to individual
characteristics or circumstances.
Much has been written on the purposes of sentencing under
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 1 6 Rather than deconstructing the
layers of political rhetoric contained in the legislative history,1 1 7 this

article proposes a therapeutic jurisprudence paradigm which draws
upon some of the statutory purpose language of promoting respect for
the law 18 and the language of the enabling act which directs the
Commission to develop a means of measuring the effectiveness of the
guidelines in meeting its goals." 9

112 Breyer,

supra note 13, at 15.

"3 Id.

Nagel, supra note 38, at 898.
t Jennifer Moore, CorporateCulpability Under the FederalSentencing Guidelines,
34 ARIZ. L. REV. 743, 748 (1992).
116Miller, supranote 111, at 417; Leonard J. Long, Millers Algebra of Purposesat
Sentencing, 66 S.CAL. L. REv. 483, 483-84 (1992) (responding to Miller's Purposes
at Sentencing); Breyer, supra note 13, at 4 (Congress's purposes were to put "honesty
in sentencing" and to reduce "unjustifiably wide sentencing disparity"); Katie & Sager,
supra note 59, at 397; Nagel & Schulberger, supra note 7, at 501. According to some
writers, the purposes of Congress and of the Commission are not always one and the
same. Professor Miller, argues that there should be a match between offenders, sentence
purpose, and the sentence, to be determined at the time of sentencing and that sentences
should have a clearly articulated purpose or purposes, but that purpose may be different
at different points in the criminal justice process. Miller, supra note 111, at 415.
117Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative
History of the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 223 (1993) (for
an exhaustive review of pertinent legislative history beginning in 1975 when Senator
Edward M. Kennedy originally introduced legislation to establish the United States
Sentencing Commission).
118 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (1988).
"1

119
28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1988).
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The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 directed Congress to
create a Commission"' and also provided instructions for
federal judges."' Congress directed the Sentencing Commission to
establish guidelines which would serve the multiple goals and
purposes of federal sentencing as established by Congress." The
express statutory purposes are to promote respect for the law, to deter
criminal behavior, to protect the public, and to rehabilitate
criminals. "
In turn, the Commission promulgated guidelines to aid the
sentencing judge in adhering to the same goals of criminal
punishment established by the enabling legislation so that the
sentencing ranges in the guidelines were to be consistent
with all of
1
the provisions of Title 18 of the United States Code. 4
In reviewing the statutory sentencing purposes, the most
intriguing purpose is the stated goal of "promoting respect for the
law. " " What little authority there is seems to indicate that
promoting respect for the law is a retributive goal,126 at least in as far
as it is linked with the phrases "need to reflect the seriousness of the
offense" and "provide just punishment." Promoting respect for the
law is apparently aimed at the public's perception of the law rather
than that of the individual offender. However, this author opines that
it makes more sense to extract this goal from its retributive neighborphrases and investigate the internalization of a defendant's moral

120
Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 217, 98 Stat. 2017 (1984) (The Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984).
121 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (1984).
11 The statutory list of sentencing purposes appears at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)
(1988).
123Id.
1428 U.S.C. § 994(a) (1988).
I' 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B) (1988).
'" See United States v. Mercedes, No. S 90 Cr. 0450 (RWS), 1991 WL 210945
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 1991) (Sweet, J., sentencing opinion):
A departure upward is appropriate is [sic] Mercedes's case. Respect
for the law will be furthered by imposing a longer sentence here.
Mercedes was a fugitive from a prior New York City arrest when
most of the activities these charges were based on occurred. This
arrest apparently did not give him pause to consider the legality of
his actions, in fact, he ignored it.
Id. at *2 (emphasis added).
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respect and compliance with the legal system. In turn, such an
analysis could buttress the public's understanding and respect for the
law, 27 which may be the intent of Congress's retributive
characterization of this goal. Presumably, laws which modify
behavior or attitudes in a socially acceptable way should receive
greater respect from society than laws which merely satisfy a sense
of retribution without the concominent behavioral adaptation.
In either paradigm, a relevant field of inquiry is whether it is
possible to legislate attitudinal change within the correctional system.
In other contexts, most notably the recently passed Americans With
Disabilities Act, such attitudinal change has been attempted. 121

VI. The Federal Offender Population
A. Significant Numbers of FederalInmates Have Mental
Disabilities
Surprisingly, there is very little literature on the psychological
makeup of prisoners in general, and even less on those serving time
in federal correctional facilities. 129 In fact, if there is evidence that
I suspect that this phrase was included as a response to the public's outcry against
I27
indeterminate sentences. This perception was inflamed by the belief that sentences did
not accurately reflect the amount of time the defendant remained incarcerated. "Mhe
recent 100 years or so of indeterminate sentencing-meaning largely unmeasured and
uncontrolled judicial discretion in fixing sentences-was the era that could properly be
characterized as one of 'lawlessness'." Marvin E. Frankel & Leonard Orland, A
ConversationAboutSentencing Commissions and Guidelines, 64 U. CoLo. L. REv. 655,
658 (1993).
28 The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (1990), has
been hailed as the most significant civil rights law since the 1960's. Peter Susser, The
ADA: Dramatically Expanded FederalRights for Disabled Americans, 16 EMPLOYEE
REL. L.J. 157, 157 (1990); Lowell Weicker, HistoricalBackground of the Americans
With Disabilities Act, 64 TEMP. L. REv. 387, 387 (1991) (stating that the ADA
expresses a national goal of assuring equal opportunity, full participation, independent
living and economic self-sufficiency, and eradication of continuing unfair and
unnecessary discrimination and prejudice against those having or perceived as having
mental and physical disabilities).
I" Henry J. Steadman et al., A Survey of Mental Disability Among State Prison
Inmates, 38 HosP. & COMMUNry PSYCHIATRY 1086, 1086 (1987) (stating that there is
a paucity of empirical studies on the occurrence of mental disorder in prisons); Edward
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a significant percentage of inmates maintain a perception of
unfairness with regard to their treatment under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines,"' can we make demographic predictions about how
certain prisoners will respond? Research in this area may provide us
with increased insight into prison populations and the connection

between sentencing practices, correctional programming,

and

recidivism.

In the mean time, we know that the prison population is
growing by leaps and bounds."' The federal inmate population
which was thought to be 53,347 at the end of 1989, has in 1992,
approached 66,000 inmates housed in sixty-eight institutions.13 2 In
1992 the institutions were being operated at one hundred and fortyfive percent of design capacity."' The number of federal prisoners
continues to grow much faster than the rate of growth in the state
systems. In 1993, federal inmates numbered 80,259, an increase of
over twelve percent from the year before. 34 With every increase,
correctional efficiency must continue to focus on the provision of

appropriate services, including mental health services to prisoners and
the safety concerns of inmates and employees. Therefore, any
information which could shed proactive light on potentially volatile
situations could be a great service.

Zamble & Frank Porporino, Coping, Imprisonment, andRehabilitation, 17 CRIM. JUST.
& BEHAv. 53, 54 (1990) (stating that there is a dearth of methodologically rigorous
psychological research on the effects of imprisonment); Richard J. Bonnie, The
Competence of CriminalDefendants With MentalRetardationto Participatein Their Own
Defense, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 419, 421 (1990) (stating that empirical data
on "under-identification" theory, which purports that the mentally retarded evade
accurate identification within the criminal justice system, is sparse).
130EDOARDO ROTmAN, BEYOND PUNISHMENT 15, 16 (1990) ("Unfairness is
essentially a disproportion between offense and punitive reaction. An unfair sentence is
bound to generate antisocial reactions. A fair sentence favors the process of
reconciliation between the lawbreaker and the community.").
Peter Kerr, TheDetoxing ofPrisoner88A0802,N.Y.TmEs MAO., June27, 1993,
at 23, 26 (the present number of prisoners in the United States is expected to rise from
1.3 million to more than 2 million people by the year 2000).
132Yale Summary, supra note 94, at 2063.
133Id.

11 PrisonJam Hits RecordDrug Arrests Cited in Crush, N.Y. NEWSDAY, May 10,
1993, at 19.
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It seems likely that inmates with mental disorders may express
anger, fear and disillusionment in maladaptive ways.
Most
researchers agree that a significant proportion of inmates have some
degree of diminished self-esteem and marginal maladjustment to
societal concerns which may be reflective of underlying personality
disorders or emotional distress.135 One study found that upon
entering prison, inmates reported a higher incidence of psychiatric
disorders than a control sample from the surrounding area.136 Often
disorders are not diagnosed even with the most diligent of screening
efforts because the symptoms are subtle or easily hidden by the
inmate.137 The disorder may also remain in remission until a time
later in the prisoner's continued retention. 3 ' The same is true for
mentally retarded prisoners, whose disabilities are often unrecognized
by attorneys, courts and prison administrators.' 39 Empirical evidence
has consistently shown that diagnosed mental retardation is found in
about ten percent of the correctional population.'4o
Studies show that prisons have a large, relatively predictable
number of inmates with severe mental illness. 141 These numbers may

' J.P. Prestelli, Maximum-Security Hospital Ward, 32 MED. SCI. & L. 337 (1992)
(stating that personality disorders are more prevalent in prisoners than in the general
population); Donald G. Dutton & Stephen D. Hart, Risk Markersfor Family Violence
in a Federally IncarceratedPopulation, 15 INT. J. L. & PsYcHATRY 101, 110 (1992)
(finding a high prevalence rate for personality disorders in Canada's federal system,
with narcissism and borderline personalities over-represented).
See Zamble &
Porporino, supra note 129, at 58 (finding very strong evidence that offenders were
unable to cope adequately with ordinary life situations. Seven percent of the inmates had
at least a mild level of depression, and almost 1 in 10 had scores indicating they were
severely depressed. 53 % had ranges of high anxiety as defined by another standardized
test). Id. at 64. However, the authors found that over the course of the next few
months of incarceration, the combined total of those who were either depressed or highly
anxious fell by almost one-third to 37%. After another year, the total dropped to about
21%, indicating that at least some inmates can satisfactorily adjust to the prison setting.
Id.
13 Bonta & Gendreau, supra note 17, at 356.
'"Fred Cohen & Joel Dvoskin, Inmates with Mental Disorders:A Guide to Law and
Practice, 16 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 462, 465 (1992).
138 Id.
'

s Bonnie, supra note 129, at 420-21.
40
Id. at 421.
" Cohen & Dvoskin, supra note 137, at 463.
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include relatively large numbers of persons diagnosed as
psychopaths. 42 Consequently, in one study, "fifteen to thirty percent
of a sample of federal inmates met the 'commonly used research
criterion for the diagnosis of psychopathology,'
depending on the
1 43
security level of the correctional institution.

A study of the New York State prison population found that
eight percent of the state's inmates have severe psychiatric or
functional disabilities that clearly warrant some type of mental health
intervention and another sixteen percent have significant mental
disabilities which require periodic services. 144 "[Slubstantial
impairments to functioning in the general prison population" were
found in nearly one-quarter of the New York state prison
population. 145 However, the specific nature and extent of those
disabilities was not assessed.
B. Empirical Methodology Must Devise an Instrument to
Measure Inmate Morals
It seems reasonable to suspect that the system cannot instill
respect for the law where the law is perceived to be incompatible
with personal or group values.' 46 Respect in this context is important
because it influences everyday behavior toward the law. 47 In the
correctional context, everyday behavior is measured in terms of
compliance with facility rules. Thus, the psychological constructs
142 Grant

Harris et al., Psychopathologyand Violent Recidivism, 15 LAW & HUM.

BEHAV. 625, 625 (1991).
143Id.
44Steadman, supra note 129, at 1089.
145 Id.

An older, less extensive study of prisoners in Oklahoma found that 10% were

severely or acutely disturbed and 35% required some mental health treatment. Id. at
1086 (citing J.F. James et al., Psychiatric Morbidity in Prisons, 11 HOSP. &
CoMMUNrrY PSYCHIATRY 674 (1980)).
"4Studies suggest that when assessing the impact of participation in the legal process
on a person's respect for the law and legal authorities, the primary influence is the
person's evaluation of the fairness of the judicial procedure itself, not the evaluation of
the legal outcome. Tom R. Tyler, The Psychological Consequences of Judicial
Procedures:Implicationsfor Civil Commitment Hearings, 46 SMU L. REV. 433, 437
(1992) [hereinafter Tyler, PsychologicalConsequences];TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE
OBEY THE LAW 94-112 (1990) [hereinafter TYLER, PEOPLE OBEY].
" TYLER, PEOPLE OBEY, supra note 146, at 94-95.
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with which an inmate enters the facility may have implications for
behavior within the correctional institution as well as future behavior
when the inmate is released from incarceration.
When devising an empirical instrument which can accurately
reflect inmate morals, one difficulty which may be encountered is the
identification of individual values. This may be a particularly
pernicious problem if the inmate is from a subculture which embraces
some values not held by the larger or dominant society.148 Thus, any
empirical methodology used should take into account an
understanding of social and cultural factors in order to avoid an
ineffective and offensive ethnocentric approach. 1 49 For instance, at
least one study has found that persons involved in felony cases, who
may be unfaily characterized as marginal adherents to society's value
system (the poor, the poorly educated, minorities, or the unemployed)
are most influenced by procedural fairness rather than the leniency of
the sentence they receive." ° Similar findings hold true across a
spectrum of research participants. Studies conducted on nonincarcerated people, who have experienced a legal procedure that they
judged to be unfair, found that those persons had less respect for the
law and legal authorities and are less likely to accept judicial
This can lead to a "gradual erosion of obedience to the
decisions.'
152
The recognition of the relation between fair legal procedures
law."
and the development of a participant's sense of justice has not been
lost on the judiciary. The Supreme Court relied on the psychological
impact of the judicial process in establishing the right to judicial
hearings in several contexts. 53

141EDoARDo

ROTMAN,

BEYOND

PUNISHMENT:

A

NEW

VIEW

ON

THE

REHABILITATION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS 7 (1990).
149 Id.

Tyler, Psychological Consequences, supra note 146, at 438.
Daniel W. Shuman & Jean A. Hamilton, Jury Service-It May Change Your
Mind: Perceptions of Fairness of Jurors and Nonjurors, 46 SMU L. REV. 449, 451
(1992); Tyler, PsychologicalConsequences, supra note 146, at 439.
15' Shuman & Hamilton, supra note 151, at 451.
151Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-66 (1970) (terminating welfare benefits
without a hearing could be psychologically harmful); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 484 (1972) (holding revocation of parole without judicial hearing could cause
prisoners psychological harm); Tyler, Psychological Consequences, supra note 146.
"5

1
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C. The Morality of "Ratting"

Despite the myriad of moral and ethical differences held by
a multicultural prison population, the societal ban against informing
spans many cultures and religions and has persisted since ancient
times."S' Even the words we use to describe an informant indicate
that it is something bad."' 5 Prison studies have offered little
systematic research on "snitches"1 6 or the "sociology of treachery. "5 7
What little work has been done simply declares that the role of the
"rat" exists and is negatively valued."5 8
From the schoolyard 'tattletale' to the police officer's
'confidential informant' to the Pentagon 'whistle
blower,' our society is deeply ambivalent toward those
who report the wrongdoing of others to the authorities.
On one hand, society values informers ....On the
other hand, society scorns informers as betrayers of
confidence. Even one who violates an antisocial pact
such as the police officer's code of silence is viewed as
having breached a trust. Such breaches leave all of us
less secure in our reliance on the confidence of
others.159
Citizens generally have no legal duty to report criminal
activity of which they may be aware." 6 However, the law deviates
"s Weinstein, supra note 16, at 4 (relating orthodox jewish law's disdain of
informers back to Roman times). Informing is also an unforgivable sin to the Irish, and
understandably so in a country where the government and the police were for centuries
the enemy of the people. Id.
i"
Id. at 3.
156 Marquart & Roebuck, supra note 2, at 218.
's See Malin Akerstrom, The Social Construction of Snitches, 9 DEvIANT BEHAv.
155 (1988).
158Id.

E. Lynch, The LawyerAs Inforner, 1986 DUKE L. J.491,491 (1986).
t Failure to report a felony was the misdemeanor "misprision" at common law. The

159 Gerard

crime evidently still exists in England and in South Carolina (State v. Carson, 262 S.E.
2d 918 (S.C. 1980)) but it has been historically criticized from the beginnings of our
system of modern justice: "It may be the duty of a citizen to accuse every offender, and
to proclaim every offense which comes to his knowledge; but the law which would
punish him in every case, for not performing this duty, is too harsh for man." Marbury
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from this general rule to make distinctions based upon the degree of
harm presented to some classes of particularly vulnerable victims.
For instance, certain classes of people may be legally obligated to
report certain kinds of actual and suspected activity, including
physicians, teachers and other childcare professionals who are
161
obligated by statute to report all suspected instances of child abuse.
Even without statutory obligation or sanction, most people
acknowledge a prevailing moral duty to protect their subjectivelydefined community from harm.
Generally, if citizens have
information about an intended or completed heinous crime, it is
expected that they will give such information to the law enforcement
authorities, absent an overwhelming fear of personal or familial
harm.162 Of course, the decision about what criminal activity tips the
balance so as to compel a person to go to the authorities is a
subjective call which balances the harm to self or community and the
ambivalence of informing.
Because society's ambivalence toward informing is rooted in
the complex interplay of moral values, it deserves the respect of our
justice system, 16' at least insofar as to recognize its impact on legal
rules and practices. For instance, informing in a criminal case has the
presumptive social benefit of aiding in the conviction of an offender.
That presumptive societal benefit, however, must be weighed against
the moral costs to the informer. 164
According to Professor Lynch, the most important factors to
be weighed in balancing the risks to the defendant with the attendant
risks imposed upon the criminal justice system are "the connection
between the potential witness and the crime, the relationship between

v. Brooks, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 556, 575-76 (1822).
1 See Levine, supra note 36.
'
Despite the seduction of fulfilling a moral imperative, most people find the idea
of reporting another's less heinous legal transgressions to be morally reprehensible. The
subjective nature of drawing such a line results in an inexact determination of moral
conviction. For example, in the early 1980s there were several news stories about high
school students who learned of the killing of a classmate by someone they knew. No
students came forward to the authorities, and when later questioned about their actions,
the students persisted in their belief that it was wrong to "tell." Weinstein, supra note
16, at 4.
" Lynch, supra note 159, at 492.
164Id. at 522.
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the witness and the perpetrator, and the seriousness of the crime. "
These relationships are most influential in the case of a non-victim
witness-informer. It is in this situation that the "rat" is most likely
to be negatively perceived as the betrayer of confidences.
"Ratting" means that you are informing on someone who has
a legitimate claim on your silence. The relationship between the
informant and offender is a key ingredient in determining the morality
of informing, both in the eyes of the public and from the perspective
of the informant. Public condemnation of "ratting" typically forms
the opinions supporting a moral obligation of silence. Where there
has been an explicit promise not to reveal certain information, the
informant has a moral duty not to reveal the information. Likewise,
where the structure of a personal bond contains an implied promise
of loyalty to a relationship, such as family membership or ethnic ties,
there is an expectation of silence. 6 This moral commitment may
also be grounded in a social or professional relationship. Some of
these relationships are so prized in our society that they are accorded
protection through evidentiary privileges. 167 In such cases, even
where the need for such information is great, the law "has determined
that the social benefits 16of8 preserving some relationships outweigh the
need for information.
When can a person justify subordinating larger loyalties in
favor of self-preservation? The propriety of informing seems to vary

6 Id. at 523.

166Id. at 528.
167See Lynch, supra note 159, at 530.
'"Lynch, supra note 159, at 529. For example, a person is not required to testify
against his or her spouse because they share a close confidential relationship. The
marital relationship is protected because of its social benefit and because it is intrinsically
valuable to the parties involved. "To impose on such a fundamental relationship would
be to violate human dignity." Id. at 530. Other relationships are not as fundamental,
but nevertheless are of enormous value, both to society and to the individual. Family
relationships, professional associations, religious affiliations, friendships, and even the
vague ties of acquaintance and fellowship that bind neighbors or people from the same
hometown are all relations essential to both social and individual well-being. Id.
Professor Lynch goes on to make the point that even the bonds which unite criminals
joined in a common venture have moral value as an expression of human solidarity.
However, the potential danger posed by criminals increasing the scope and efficiency of
their criminal activities by banding together may outweigh any benefit that results from
the relationship. Id.
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with the gravity of the offense in question.
Under any
consequencialist moral system, the harm that the informer seeks to
prevent must be weighed against the wrong that will result from the
betrayal of friends and associates. "It is anomalous but I think true,
that destroying these ties [between parent and child, spouses,
extended family and tribe through the overuse of informers] creates
grave problems for a society that can lose all sense of humanity
because its members lose much of their feelings for those near to
them.

"s169

VII. CONCLUSION
The bottom line is do we care? Or should we care? Are the
inmates who are presumably most at risk, the young, 170 those jaded
by excessive sentences, 7 1 racial and ethnic minorities," and at least
twenty-five percent of the prison population which are believed to
have mental disabilities, 173 a group significant enough to impact on
policy considerations? Because of the dramatic effect their behavioral
reactions may have on the system as a whole, they are significant.
Development of this hypothesis must begin with the query, do
accused and/or convicted federal offenders perceive the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines provisions as unjust? 74 Second, are federal

"

Weinstein, supra note 16, at 4.

170R. Barry Ruback & Timothy S. Carr, Prison Crowding Over Tune: The

Relationship of Density and Changes in Density to Infraction Rates, 20 CRIM. JUST. &
BEHAV. 131, 141 (1993).
171One study found that longer sentences were associated with greater levels of
recidivism than shorter sentences. See Paul B. Paulus & Mary T. Dzindolet, The Effects
of Prison Confinement, in PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY 327 (Peter Suedfeld &
Philip E. Tetlock eds., 1992).
172"Most alarming, however, is the disproportionate number of minority offenders
in our state and federal prisons. We incarcerate African American males at four times
the rate of South Africa." Debra L. Dailey, Prison and Race in Minnesota, 64 U. COL.
L. REV. 761, 761 (1993).
"7Henry J. Steadman et al., A Survey of Mental Disability Among State Prison
Inmates, 38 HoSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 1086 (1987).
" An important finding by studies of people's reactions to judicial procedures is that
people are not primarily influenced by the outcome of their experience but by their
assessment of the fairness of the case disposition process and the fairness of the sentence.
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defendants and inmates sophisticated enough to differentiate between
their overall feelingi of disempowerment within the system and their
specific response to treatment under Guideline provisions?17 1 Third,
can an empirical instrument be designed to test such an inquiry? 76
Fourth, once we have this information, can the offending legal
provisions be modified to increase the defendant-inmates' perception
of fairness and 1promote
cooperation and compliance with socially
77
goals?
desirable
If we assume that there is a significant proportion of
defendants and inmates who can articulate a specific resentment from
their perceived unjust treatment under the guidelines and that an
instrument can be devised to measure such responses, then social
scientists should be able to correlate these feelings of unfairness with
empirical evidence of behavioral trends within the trial system, the
correctional facility, and possibly with trends in recidivism. These
correlations could be used to initiate policy considerations in future
amendments to, or applications of, particular provisions of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
One conclusion which may be substantiated by such research
is that persons forced to "rat" 178 against others have a greater

Jonathan Casper et al., ProceduralJustice inFelony Cases, 22 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 483,
485 (1988); Tyler, Psychological Consequences, supra note 146, at 436-37.
17SOn a management level, some have observed decreased incentives for good
behavior from inmates because of the reduced amount of sentence reduction time
available for forfeiture in the disciplinary process. On the other hand, the reduced
sentence disparity and increased certainty of release dates tended to lessen a source of
frustration in the inmate population. Yale Summary, supra note 94, at 2063 (comments
of Harlen W. Penn).
76 Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Facts: Scientific Methodology as Legal
Precedent, 76 CAL. L. REv. 877, 877 (1988); John Monahan & Laurens Walker,
Judicial Use of Social Science Research, 15 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 571, 571 (1991).
" See Wexler, Health Care Compliance, supra note 35, at 27-28 (stating judges at
conditional release hearings could use principles of health care compliance such as
behavioral contracts); Bruce J. Winick, Harnessingthe Power of the Bet: Wagering with
the Government as a Mechanism for Social and Individual Change, in ESSAYS, supra
note 26, at 219, 239 (stating that when criminal sanctions have not succeeded in
deterring socially harmful behavior, we need to devise new approaches to supplement
criminal sanctions).
I"s
The term "rat" is used here to distinguish between the coerced testimony of some
witnesses from the volitional desire of others to testify against another.
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propensity to give perjured testimony,179 thereby throwing the trial
process into chaos. The probative value of any potentially coerced
testimony is suspect; 180 courts have recognized the power of
emotional coercion as well as physical intimidation.1 81 Unfortunately,
there is a history of "jailhouse rats""' who use the system both to
manipulate the government into lenient sentences and as a means to
continue criminal enterprises. 83 There is always a danger in using
informants to make cases"' because the "rats," due to emotional
lability, greed, or sociopathic personality, may have no compunction
about using perjured testimony to achieve an objective.
Generating data on the cognitive responses of "turned"
inmates may lead to important insights in predicting the occurrence
179 Haglund,

supra note 2, at 1416 (Jailhouse informants are remarkably unreliable

and intuition suggests that they are cut from the same cloth as other informants so that
the ingenuity of jailhouse informants' lies illustrate the potential for perjury committed
by others. When an informant does not have any or enough information to bargain for
leniency, he or she may be tempted to fabricate information.). "It is difficult to imagine
a greater motivation to lie than the inducement of a reduced sentence." United States
v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 315 (5th Cir. 1987).
"sArizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 287-88, 292-93 (1991) (holding that
prisoner's confession to undercoverjailhouse informant was involuntary and violated the
14th Amendment).
"' As interrogators have turned to more subtle forms of psychological persuasion,
courts have found the mental condition of the defendant to be a more significant factor.
Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 286 n.2.
12 "Jailhouse informant" describes a person who informs law enforcement officers
of "confessions" made by ceilmates.
Elizabeth A. Ganong, Note, Involuntary
Confessions and the Jailhouse Informant.- An Examination of Arizona v. Fulminante, 19
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 911, 912 n.16 (1992).
1 Over the last 10 years the Los Angeles District Attorney usedjailhouse informants
to obtain convictions in more than 120 cases. Jana Winograde, Note, Jailhouse
Informants and the Need for Judicial Use Immunity in Habeas Corpus Proceeding, 78
CAL. L. REv. 755, 756 (1990). However, a scandal broke in 1988 involving jailhouse
snitch Leslie White. White testified in three unrelated murder cases and one burglary
case within a span of 36 days. He was released from jail three weeks later, several
months ahead of his scheduled release. "Every time I come here," White boasted, "I
inform and get back out." A Snitch's Story, TME MAO., Dec. 12, 1988, at 32. White
said that he and other informants commit perjury "because we have learned that the
reward, the privileges, the favors and the freedom offered by the district attorney for
jailhouse informant testimony far outweighs any reward for the truth." Ted Rohrlich,
Jail Inmate Says He Lied in Role as Informant, L.A. TIMES, Dee. 1, 1988, at 1.
154 Nonetheless, informant testimony is used in a huge number of cases.
See
Haglund, supra note 2, at 1412.
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of related administrative concerns within correctional management.
When "ratting" is seen as the only means of decreasing draconian
sentences, the potential for racing to the prosecutor is inevitable.
This leads to disparity in sentencing, depending upon which criminal
actor reaches the prosecutor's ear first."18 Persons known to be
informers are often obliged to remain in protective custody for the
duration of their sentence, at a significantly increased cost to the
government. For example, the state of Arizona implemented a
determinate sentencing system in July of 1978.186 During that year,
the state correctional complex housed thirty people in protective
custody beds. Three years later, the number of inmates requiring
protective custody increased to three hundred and thirty, a jump of
1100 percent. This increase has been attributed to the vast numbers
of criminal defendants seeking sentencing leniency by informing on
others, thereby requiring specialized treatment in state facilities. 17
Of course, not all defendants possess the right kind or quality
of information to qualify for the assistance reduction. This is often
true of so-called "skells,""'8 who typically face extraordinarily long
prison terms even when charged with the distribution of small
quantities of drugs. 89 Even if the government does not offer the
"skell" a deal, potential leaks as to the identity of the informant often
oblige the government to provide protection to such persons in the
interests of safety within the institution.
"I "itwas

quite common that the lookout would get 20 years, the triggerman three

years, because the triggerman got to the prosecutor first." Joel Dvoskin, Address at
New York Law School Journalof Human Rights Symposium, Therapeutic Jurisprudence:
Restructuring Mental Disability Law (Apr. 23, 1993) (regarding correctional
observations in the wake of implementing the Arizona State determinate sentencing
system) (video tape on file with author). See Yale Summary, supranote 94, at 2058 (Joe
B. Brown, former U.S. Attorney, Nashville, Tennessee, urges the rejection of a proposal
to allow judges to depart).
'S' ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-101 (1994).
187 Dvoskin,

supra note 185.

s Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Negotiated Pleas Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: The First Fifieen Months, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 231, 270
(1989) (explaining that "skells" are addicted sellers who deal in small quantities of drugs
to support their own habits).
's Id. at 270 n.136 (stating that a defendant who is charged with distributing less
than five grams of crack, has two similar prior convictions, and is over 18 years old is
looking at a guideline range of roughly 22 to 27 years imprisonment if convicted).
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Another area ripe for inquiry is whether inmates who are
demoralized by a system they find to be at odds with their own moral
code and who believe that the system is merely a charade of justice
are the same people who will have difficulty conforming their
behavior to that mandated by the correctional institution. 190 Research
in this area is sparse as well. However, some research regarding
certain inmate groups may be found. For example, persons with
untreated mental disabilities are more likely to be involved in
disciplinary incidents,191 young prisoners cause the most institutional
disruption, 1" and incidents related to racial discord may explain
increased disciplinary infractions."' Are these the inmates who find
the system the most unfair? A research strategy is needed to answer
these questions.
It may be possible to gain some insight by looking at studies
on motivation and to apply those findings to the situations
encountered by prisoners sentenced under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. The work of Edward Deci is particularly instructive.
Deci has distinguished three types of motivational systems: intrinsic,
extrinsic and amotivational.19" The amotivational system takes over
when a person perceives "that there is no relationship between
behaviors and rewards on outcomes. Perceived competence, selfdetermination and self-esteem tend to be extremely low. People who
are amotivational feel helpless, incompetent and out-of-control." ' 95
If inmates feel demoralized by the procedural injustice they
"So Larson & Berg, supra note 17, at 136 (Inmates interviewed for purpose of study
expressed the contention that determinate sentencing is irrational and vindictive. It was
"obvious" to these inmates that the same crime may be committed in different ways and
for different reasons.).
'9' Cohen & Dvoskin, supra note 137, at 463 (stating untreated mentally ill inmates
are more likely to be involved in serious disciplinary infractions including assaults on
staff and other inmates, as well as being victimized themselves by predatory inmates).
" Ruback & Carr, supra note 170, at 131 (stating that disciplinary infraction rates
and assault rates are primarily a function of an increasing proportion of young inmates
in the prison population).
'9' Id. at 135.

19 See EDWARD L. DEci, INTRINSIC MOTIVATION(1975); EDWARD L. DEcI, THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF SELF-DETERMINATION 140 (1980).
'" See Bruce Winick, The Side Effects of Incompetency Labeling and the
Implications of Mental Health Law 26 (1993) (unpublished manuscript on file with
author).
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experience under the guidelines, and continue to feel this way upon
entering the correctional institution, then subsequent maladaptive
behavior and the inability to follow correctional directives may be
expected pursuant19 6 to the operation of the inmate's amotivational
response system.
A third issue to consider is that of recidivism. Can we make
the claim that the same inmates who are most likely to give perjured
testimony or cause disciplinary problems within the institution, are
those with recurrent recidivism statistics? There is support for the
proposition that inmates who participate in correctional programs,
those who see the system as working in a rational way, may continue
to use the system in an acceptable way once they get out, therefore,
maintaining a reduction in criminal recidivism.197 A variety of
current behavioral or cognitive measures were related to recidivism.
Prisoners who had little respect for the system were the most likely
to become recidivists.1 98 However, there is little evidence that
psychiatric programs in prison have any direct relationship on
recidivism rates outside prison. 99
By Congressional mandate, the guidelines seek to promote
respect for the law. This goal, in a therapeutic jurisprudence
formulation, should be aggressively pursued. In keeping with the
Congressional mandate, the Commission is to develop a "means of

96 Id. at 29.
1' Paul Gendreau & Robert R. Ross, Revivification ofRehabilitation:Evidencefom
the 1980's, 4 JUST. Q. 349, 350-51 (1987) (stating that reduction in criminal recidivism
may be possible through correctional rehabilitation). The notion of prison "therapeutic
communities" is based upon similar concepts, where participants are resocialized and
eventually forced to embrace responsibility, honesty and caring for others. Researchers
have been cautiously optimistic about the success of therapeutic communities in lowering
recidivism rates. Id.; Harry K. Wexler et al., Outcome Evaluation of a Prison
Therapeutic Community for Substance Abuse Treatment, 17 CiuM. JUST. & BEHAV: 71,

89 (1990) (convincing evidence that prison-based treatment can produce significant
reductions in recidivism rates). Likewise, the "bootcamp" approach focuses youths on
changing their attitudes toward themselves and toward criminal behavior. Paulus &
Dzindolet, supra note 171, at 333.
11 Zamble & Porporino, supra note 129, at 59.
"' Cohen & Dvoskin, supra note 137, at 464. Contra Zamble & Porporino, supra
note 128, at 53 ("It has become increasingly clear that appropriate application of
contemporary behavioral and cognitive treatments can change offender's behavior, even
when judged by the bottom-line criterion of recidivism rate.") (citations omitted).
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measuring the degree to which the sentencing . . .practices are
purposes set forth. "2° The therapeutic
effective in meeting the .
jurisprudence formulation offers an interdisciplinary paradigm for
assessing the therapeutic effect of certain provisions of the guidelines
Unfortunately, the guidelines have not
on federal offenders.
decreased criminal activity.2" 1 Even though the guidelines receive
overwhelmingly negative reviews, 2 they appear to be a fixed part of
our federal criminal procedure. Despite the ever-increasing explosion
of articles on all aspects of the guidelines, there are few normative or
empirical studies which assess the guidelines provisions from the
perspective of the defendant or inmate. This article suggests a
research agenda which challenges others to generate empirical data
to decrease that gap.
I suspect that such empirical data will show that the offender's
consternation, anguish, and rebellion cannot be relieved over carrot
soup and salad in a trendy Tribeca lunch spot. However, we must
begin to acknowledge the offender's emotional and behavioral
responses from trial through incarceration, and consider the role these
responses may play in recidivism rates.

28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (1988).
2'Weinstein, supra note 12, at 8.
Only four out of hundreds who testified before the Federal Courts Study
Committee supported the guidelines. Those four were the Attorney General Richard
Thornburgh and three members of the commission. Michael Tonry, The Success of
Judge Frankel's Sentencing Commission, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 713, 715 (1993).

